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Abstracts 
A theoretical underpinning of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) is that countries are 
better suited to form a currency union the more their business (output) cycles are 
synchronised or symmetric. If countries within a monetary union have similar business 
cycles or rather experience identical shocks, separate economic policies are therefore not 
necessary, this implying that asymmetries in output fluctuations and shocks would 
appropriately necessitate individual policy responses. Negative correlation of business 
cycles and shocks would therefore weaken the case for a common currency. This paper 
consequently tested business cycle synchronicity across the WAMZ by investigating the 
similarity and the co-movements between the two main components of business cycles: 
(i) the classical business cycles and (ii) the deviation business cycles, employing simple 
correlation analyses and the analysis of variance (ANOVA) to establish homogeneities or 
otherwise. The observation of the closeness of coefficient of variations of classical and 
deviation business cycles of individual WAMZ country were also examined. The Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filtering method (at lambda=100) was employed in filtering and 
decomposing the real output (GDP) of individual WAMZ countries into transitory and 
permanent components required for the assessment of classical and deviation business 
cycles in these countries. Correlation tests as well as tests of homogeneity of variance 
(Levene Statistics) in business cycles were performed. There were further investigations 
of the transitory and deviation (output gap) business cycles so as to determine the extent 
of cyclical convergence of member countries.  This is relevant for the conduct of the future 
common monetary policy. Fifteen bilateral Euclidean distances between output gaps in 
the WAMZ countries were also measured in order to reveal the extent of business cycle 
co-movements among member countries. Time span covered by this study were split into 
two periods: (i) pre-convergence period (1981-2000); (ii) convergence period (2001-
2015). This split is significant in bringing about comparative results in these two periods because of the possibility of these WAMZ countries behaving ‘artificially’ in their business 
attitudes during the convergence era, when efforts were being made to meet the 
convergence criteria. This research work yielded various results and findings which on 
the overall produced evidences to suggest that business cycles across the WAMZ are not 
synchronised. This thus weakens the case for a common currency with the WAMZ 
enclave. 
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1. Background 
The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) was formed formally, in 2000. The monetary 
enclave consists of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The 
purpose of establishing the WAMZ was towards the formation of a monetary union 
characterised by a common central bank and a single currency (the eco), which was to 
replace the existing national currencies of member countries. The proposed monetary 
union failed to commence after some few attempts, the last of which was in 2015. The 
initial idea was that the WAMZ (of the Anglophone West African countries and Guinea) 
will merge with the existing West African CFA zone franc shared by members of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) to form a formidable monetary union across the whole of West Africa in the future as part of the African Economic Community’s 
six-stage process of achieving a monetary union and a single currency for Africa by 2028. 
The failed January 2015 take off of the WAMZ caused the Heads of States and 
Governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to change 
focus and strategy by relinquishing the initial plan of the WAMZ-WAEMU merger and 
replacing this with rescheduling the creation of a single currency for the 15-member 
ECOWAS countries by January 2020. 
There were four quantitative primary convergence criteria for countries within the 
WAMZ: (i) single digit inflation rate by 2000 and inflation rate of 5% by 2003; (ii) budget 
deficit (excluding grants) of not more than 5% of GDP by 2000 and 4% by 2002; (iii) central bank financing of budget deficit to be limited to 10% of previous year’s tax 
revenue; and (iv) gross external reserves to cover at least three months of imports by the 
end of 2000 and six months by end-2003. Additional six secondary convergence criteria 
to be observed in support of the primary convergence criteria are: no accumulation of 
new domestic payment arrears and liquidation of all old arrears; tax revenue should not 
be less than 20% of the GDP; wage bill should not be less than 35% of tax revenue; 
domestically financed public investment should be at least 20% of tax revenue; the 
central parity of nominal exchange rate determined on 31 December, 2003 should be 
maintained with 15 per cent fluctuation band as defined by WAMZ Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM-II); maintenance of positive real interest rates. 
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Table 1: WAMZ Members' Primary Convergence Criteria Attainments (2000-2014) 
Budget Deficit/GDP (….should be ≤ 4%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 3.6 9.8 9.1 5.2 9.9 8.4 2.7 1.1 4.2 8.6 2.7 4.2 4.6 8.8 9.1 
Ghana 10.1 13.2 8.3 7.5 8.1 6.9 12.9 1.4 19.5 12.4 5.9 0.9 5.9 8.2 6.4 
Guinea 5.2 3.4 6.2 8.8 5.9 1.6 2.0 0.9 1.7 7.5 14.3 2.9 3.7 3.1 3.9 
Liberia 0.9 1.9 1.0 3.7 4.4 0.9 -3.0 3.4 2.0 2.0 -4.2 -0.6 -4.2 -1.0 -2.0 
Nigeria 2.7 5.8 5.9 2.8 17.0 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 3.3 3.8 5.0 2.6 2.7 1.0 
S/Leone 17.3 16.7 16.5 19.4 14.3 9.5 8.5 5.0 7.0 11.0 5.2 5.0 5.6 1.5 3.4 
Inflation Rates (….should be ≤5% or 0.05) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 0.2 8.1 13.0 17.6 8.0 1.8 1.4 6.0 6.8 2.7 5.0 4.8 4.3 5.7 5.6 
Ghana 40.5 21.3 15.2 23.6 11.8 13.9 10.9 12.8 18.1 16.0 14.7 8.7 9.2 11.6 15.5 
Guinea 7.2 5.2 6.1 12.9 27.6 29.7 39.1 12.8 13.5 7.9 15.5 21.4 15.2 11.9 9.7 
Liberia 3.2 19.4 11.1 5.0 16.1 7.0 8.9 11.7 9.4 7.8 7.3 8.5 7.7 7.6 9.9 
Nigeria 14.5 16.4 12.1 23.8 10.0 11.6 8.5 6.6 15.1 12.0 12.4 10.8 12.2 8.5 8.0 
S/Leone -28.0 3.4 -1.3 11.3 14.4 13.1 7.3 13.8 12.3 12.0 17.1 16.0 12.9 10.4 7.1 
Central Bank Financing (….should be ≤10% RF) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 0.0 80.7 22.0 63.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.9 13.7 14.9 12.6 0.4 na 41.0 
Ghana 57.9 0.0 12.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 9.2 11.0 
Guinea 24.0 -0.7 24.5 14.6 26.2 -8.8 54.0 0.0 5.8 38.7 91.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Liberia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nigeria 0.0 29.3 0.0 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
S/Leone 0.0 8.9 0.0 26.4 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.8 0.3 18.6 37.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 7.6 
Gross External Reserves (….should be ≥6 months) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 7.5 7.2 2.9 3.1 4.7 5.2 4.9 4.4 4.3 6.5 6.8 6.1 4.8 na 3.7 
Ghana 0.8 1.2 2.3 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.9 2.2 4.4 3.7 3.15 0.03 3.5 4.2 
Guinea 2.2 2.8 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.1 1.0 4.2 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.1 
Liberia 3.6 2.6 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.3 3.3 2.2 2.4 3.0 
Nigeria 13.6 11.3 9.9 8.5 16.1 11.8 15.1 17.4 15.3 13.0 7.9 6.3 9.5 8.9 7.4 
S/Leone 2.8 2.3 3.1 1.7 3.3 4.8 4.9 5.1 4.2 6.2 1.9 2.56 2.5 2.1 2.8 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
A mid-term convergence assessment in 2002 revealed that despite some achievements 
by WAMZ member countries, these were not adequate enough support the take-off of the 
monetary union in January 2003. A major problem was the inadequate commitment of 
member countries of WAMZ to support their commitment expressed with actions. This 
consequently led to the extension of the WAMZ programme to 30 June, 2005 so that the 
common central bank and the common currency would take off on 1 July 2005. Another 
deadline of 31 December, 2009 was set so that the single currency and the common 
central bank would be effective from 1 January 2010. Due to same reasons this could not 
be met. The official reason for this action was stated as "the global economic and financial 
crisis which has put constraints on member state's ability to meet the convergence 
criteria individually and collectively". The last agreed take off date of 1 January 2015 
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actually became unrealistic thus bringing about heavy cloud over the take-off of the 
monetary union.1 It is necessary to state that as at date, the WAMZ has no take-off date. 
Tables 1 above exhibits the year-by-year attainments of the primary convergence criteria 
by the six WAMZ countries over the thirteen-year convergence period spanning from 
2000 to 2014. The summary of the three-year (2012-2014) averages of the achievements 
of these primary criteria are presented in the first segment of Table 2. Further in Tables 
2, the country-by-country achievements of five secondary convergence criteria by the 
WAMZ countries over a 13-year period (2010-2013) are displayed. On comparative basis, 
Tables 3 below shows the rankings of the WAMZ countries regarding the meeting of the 
primary and secondary convergence criteria over the 3-year periods of assessments 
while the ranking of the 3-year averages over the period of 13 years are as displayed in 
Table 4. Nigeria and Guinea respectively achieved the number one spots in the 
achievements of the primary and secondary convergence criteria while Ghana and Sierra 
Leone took the last position in each category, respectively. In general, for both the 
primary and secondary convergence criteria over the 3-year period, Nigeria gets the 
number one ranking as Ghana and Sierra Leone share the position at the bottom of the 
table.  
Table 2: 3-year Averages of Convergence Indicators Attainments by WAMZ Members 
3-year Average of Primary Convergence Indicators (2012-2014) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget Deficit/GDP (≤4%)  
5.7 
 
6.8 
 
3.5 
 
-2.4 
 
2.1 
 
3.5 
Inflation Rates (≤5%) 5.2 12.1 12.2 8.4 9.5 10.1 
Central Bank 
Financing(≤10%) 
 
20.7 
 
6.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
2.5 
Gross External Reserves 
(≥6 months) 
 
4.2 
 
2.6 
 
3.2 
 
2.5 
 
8.6 
 
2.4 
3-year Average of Secondary Convergence Indicators (2010-2013) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Tax Revenue/GDP 
(≥20%) 
 
13.6 
 
16.9 
 
17.1 
 
24.2 
 
12.8 
 
9.8 
Wage Bill/Tax Revenue 
(≤35%) 
 
44.4 
 
46.6 
 
28.7 
 
47.4 
 
38.0 
 
58.2 
Public Investment/Tax 
Revenue (≥20%) 
 
7.7 
 
14.7 
 
27.8 
 
13.6 
 
17.7 
 
26.6 
Real Interest Rates (> 0)  
4.5 
 
8.5 
 
2.2 
 
-6.8 
 
-6.5 
 
-7.7 
Stability of Real Exchange 
Rate (± 5%) 
 
-4.5 
 
-10.2 
 
-5.6 
 
-4.7 
 
-1.1 
 
5.4 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 From all indications, the WAMZ member countries found it difficult to meet the convergence criteria. 
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Table 3: Rankings of the Attainments of the Convergence Indicators by WAMZ Members 
Rankings of the 3-year Average of Primary Convergence Indicators (2012-2014) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget 
Deficit/GDP 
5 6 3 1 2 3 
Inflation 
Rates 
1 5 6 2 3 4 
Central Bank 
Financing 
6 5 1 1 1 4 
Gross 
External 
Reserves 
2 4 3 5 1 6 
Member 
Country's 
Total 
14 20 13 9 7 17 
Overall 
Ranking 
4th 6th 3rd 2nd 1st 5th 
Rankings of the 3-year Average of Secondary Nominal Convergence Indicators (2011-2013) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Tax Revenue/ 
GDP 
4 3 2 1 5 6 
Wage Bill/Tax 
Revenue 
3 4 1 5 2 6 
Public 
Investment/Tax 
Revenue 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
Real Interest 
Rates 
2 1 3 5 4 6 
Stability of Real 
Exchange Rate 
3 6 5 4 2 1 
Member 
Country's Total 
18 18 12 20 16 21 
Overall Ranking 3rd 3rd 1st 5th 2nd 6th 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
Table 4: Rankings of the 3-year Average of General (Primary and Secondary) Convergence Indicators (2010-
2012) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget 
Deficit/GDP 
5 6 3 1 2 3 
Inflation Rates 1 5 6 2 3 4 
Central Bank 
Financing 
6 5 1 1 1 4 
Gross External 
Reserves 
2 4 3 5 1 6 
Tax Revenue/ 
GDP 
4 3 2 1 5 6 
Wage Bill/Tax 
Revenue 
3 4 1 5 2 6 
Public 
Investment/Tax 
Revenue 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
Real Interest 
Rates 
2 1 3 5 4 6 
Stability of Real 
Exchange Rate 
3 6 5 4 2 1 
Member 
Country's Total 
32 38 25 29 23 38 
Overall Ranking 4th 5th 2nd 3rd 1st 5th 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
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Within the convergence indictors' context, these ranking demonstrates the readiness of 
the six WAMZ countries for the currency union, from the most-ready (the top ranked) 
and the least-ready (the low-ranked). The WAMZ’s single currency failed to take-off and was postponed on three occasions in 
2003, 2005 and 2009. In July 2014, due to lack of economic convergence among the 
WAMZ members, as well as apparent inadequate preparations, glaringly reflecting non-
feasibility of the January 2015 take-off,  the WAMZ gave up the introduction of the single 
currency as proposed and the Heads of States and Governments of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) changed focus and strategy by 
relinquishing the initial plan of the WAMZ-WAEMU merger and replacing this with 
rescheduling the creation of a single currency for the 15-member ECOWAS countries by 
January 2020.  
In the bid to accelerate the pace for the introduction of the West African single currency, 
the Presidential Task Force set up by the Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS 
considered three options (as displayed in Table 5 below) and eventually recommended 
that Option 2 (The Gradual Option) be adopted. The Gradual Option highlighted that the 
participation of countries in the single currency will be based on compliance with the 
primary convergence criteria before 2020. 
Table 5: Options for Single Currency in ECOWAS 
 Options Highlights 
Option 1 
 
 
Big Bang 
By 2020, all ECOWAS member countries will participate in the 
single currency; and countries that cannot meet the 
convergence criteria ex-ante will achieve these ex-post. 
Option 2 
 
 
Gradualist 
Member countries of ECOWAS that are able to meet the 
primary convergence criteria before 2020 will participate in 
the single currency. 
Option 3 
 
 
Critical Mass 
The launching of the single currency will take place in 2020 on 
the condition that the critical mass of countries representing at least 75% of the region’s GDP 
Source: ECOWAS Commission The Task Force rejected Option 1 and Option 3 because of the apparent ‘too high’ levels 
of risks relating to macroeconomic instability if these two options are adopted. Given the 
present situations in the West Africa region, Table 6 below reflects four possible 
convergence situations that can result in 2020. 
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Table 6: Possible Convergence Situation in ECOWAS by 2020 
Convergence Situation Possible Qualifying Countries Possible Outcomes 
Situation 1  
WAEMU countries 
Current status-quo, leading to a fresh 
postponement of the ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Situation 2 WAEMU countries + Nigeria + 
Ghana + few other WAMZ 
Countries 
Launching of ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Situation 3 WAEMU countries + WAMZ 
countries, but without Nigeria and 
Ghana. 
Fresh postponement of the ECOWAS 
single currency because of the need 
to grant more time for the exclusion 
of the two economic heavy weights 
(Nigeria and Ghana). 
Situation 4 WAEMU countries + WAMZ 
countries 
Launching of the ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Source: Bakoup and Ndoye (2016) 
In order to meet the January 2020 deadline and the launching of the single currency as 
scheduled, those critical measures that were not well addressed in the past were 
highlighted for full implementation before 2017. These were: (a) preparing a strategy and 
procedures for the future single currency of the ECOWAS monetary integration; (b) 
drafting a treaty that will establish the monetary union between member countries of 
ECOWAS and for all members to ratify this treaty; (c) designing, adopting and ratifying 
the Article of Association of the future common central bank for ECOWAS. In May 2015, 
there was the rationalisation of the total number of convergence criteria from eleven to 
six, consisting of four primary criteria and two secondary criteria. These modifications 
also involved the reviews and changes in some benchmarks. The new primary criteria 
are: (i) ratio of budget deficit (commitment basis, including grants) to GDP of less than or 
equal to 3%2; (ii) average annual inflation rate of less than 10%3; (iii) central bank financing of budget deficit of less than or equal to 10% of the previous year’s tax revenue; 
and (iv) gross external reserves - higher than or equal to 3 months of imports4. The new 
secondary criteria:5 (a) stable nominal exchange rate of +/- 10%; and (b) ratio of total 
public debt to GDP of not more than 70%. 
Consequent upon these background information, this paper, in consideration of the 
significance of the feasibility of monetary integration of West Africa, considered the 
                                                          
2
 Previously, the maximum target for budget deficit/GDP ratio was 4% (excluding grants). 
3
 This is against the former maximum of 5%. 
4
 The previous cover was 6 months.  
5
 Criteria removed in the rationalisation exercise were: positive real interest rate, real exchange rate stability, non-
accumulation of domestic and external arrears, tax revenue/GDP, wage bill/tax revenue and public investments/tax revenue.  
 
8 
 
relevance of the business cycle synchronicity property and theory of the OCA and tested 
if business cycles across the WAMZ are sychronised.  
2. Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Properties and Theoretical Underpinnings  
There are so many definition of an optimum currency area given in literature.  One can 
describe an optimum currency area as a domain within which exchange rates are fixed 
and monetary policy best maintain full employment, balanced international payments 
and a stable internal average price. It is an area that for optimal balance adjustments and 
effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic policy, has fixed exchange rates within the area 
but maintain flexible exchange rates with trading partners. It is a geographical region in 
which economic efficiencies are shared and huge economic benefits are created by a 
single currency; a region in which the benefits of forming a monetary union outweigh the 
cost. It is also a geographical and economic domain that operates one currency and one 
monetary policy operates and have a general means of payments either a single currency 
or several currencies whose exchange value are immutably pegged to one another with 
unlimited convertibility for both current and capital market transactions, but whose 
exchange rate fluctuate in unison against the rest of the world. 
The history of the theory of optimum currency area (OCA) dates back to early 1960s when 
the criteria that should gauge the optimality of a region to have a single currency, thus 
forming a common currency area (OCA) was first formulated by Robert Mundell in 1961 
and further developed significantly by Ronald McKinnon in 1963 and Peter Kenen in 
1969. According to Krahi (2010), these three men contributed the main pieces for an 
academic debate where common notion has not been found yet, thus making the theory 
of optimal currency area an unfinished puzzle. In spite of the fact Robert Mundell is 
known as the father of the theory of optimum currency area, having formulated and 
named the theory, he was not the first to delve on the issue within the idea of the theory.  
The development of the optimum currency area concept came in the context of the 
discussions of the relative advantages of the fixed exchange rate regime over the flexible 
exchange rate regime. During the early part of the Bretton Wood System, economists 
from many angles had various discussions which centre on the result and effect of the 
fixed exchange regime; and some of their conclusion influenced the theory of optimum 
currency area (OCA). According to Mongelli (2005: 608), the OCA theory was developed 
when the Bretton Wood System of fixed exchange was still in operation. What Mundell 
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tried to do was to determine if it would be optimal for currency of countries to float freely 
(Mundell, 1961). The predominant focus of Mundell is on areas with a single currency in 
which the control of money supply would be in the hands of one central bank.  
In agreement with Cesarano (2006), discussions on the OCA theory and field associated 
with it can be categorised into two namely: the Friedman’s View on one hand and the 
positions of Mundell, Mckinnon and Kenen on the other hand. Though, regarded as two 
groups of opinions, Kawai (1987) however sees Friedman to have opted for flexible 
exchange rate while Dellas and Tavlas (2009) see Friedman as having a critical view on 
policies that brings stabilization at the domestic level in accordance with the traditions 
of Keynesian economists. In the 1950s, it was generally assumed that Friedman called for 
flexible exchange rate regime. Boyer (2009) however regarded Friedman as the man who 
laid foundation for the subsequent theory of optimum currency area. 
There are two major phases of contributions to the theory of optimum currency area: 
Pioneering Phase (first wave) and Cost-benefit Phase (second wave).  In the Pioneering 
Phase Robert Mundell (1961), Ronald McKinnon (1963) and Peter Kenen (1969) are the 
important authors regarded as the traditional contributors of the OCA theory. Notable 
authors and contributors in the Cost-benefit Phase (second wave) are Corden (1972), 
Ishiyama (1975), Tower and Willet (1976) and Mundell (1973). Three major properties 
of the OCA theory are: 
Property 1 - Labour Mobility and Wage Flexibility: These are contributions by Robert 
Mundell (1961) Robert Mundell is the initial contributor to the theory of optimum 
currency area in 1961 when he identified factor mobility as the strategic attribute of an 
optimum currency area. 
Property 2 - Size and Openness of the Economy: These are the contributions made by 
Ronald McKinnon (1963): Ronald McKinnon is a second major contributor to the theory 
of optimum currency area as he emphasises on the size and the degree of openness of an 
economy as a factor that is crucial in a currency area that is optimal.6 
Property 3 - Diversification of Production: These are contributions by Peter Kenen (1969). In 1969, Peter Kenen introduced ‘Product Diversification’ as a more relevant criterion of 
                                                          
6This is the second major OCA criterion added by McKinnon The first criterion by Robert Mundell in 1961 is mobility 
of labour and flexibility of wages saying that if labour can easily move from a country that is negatively affected, to a 
country that is positively affected, any asymmetric shock between these countries would be outweighed while any 
central bank policy would be made redundant.  
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an optimum currency area. Kenen (1969) says that with “diversity in a nation’s product 
mix, the number of single product regions contained in a single country may be more relevant than labour mobility”. 
Right from the early 1960s when the theory of optimum currency area came to limelight, 
several authors, through their various seminal contributions have been able to come up 
with various properties of an optimum currency area. Most of these properties, which 
many regarded as prerequisites, features attributes or criteria of an optimum currency 
area are summarised in the Box 1 below: 
Box 1: Properties/Criteria of an Optimum Currency Area and Implications 
Properties/Criteria Implications 
Flexibility of Nominal Wages 
and Price (Friedman, 1963) 
Flexibility of wages and prices within/between members of a common 
currency area will make asymmetric shocks to be overcome easily because 
the movement adjusting for the shocks will not be linked with inflation in one 
country and/or sustained unemployment in another and thus bringing in 
higher degree of stability in the common currency area  
Mobility of Factors of 
Production - Including labour 
(Mundell, 1961) 
There will be reduction in the need to alter real factor prices and nominal 
exchange rate between member countries when responding to disturbances, 
if factors of production are mobile within the common currency area, even if 
factor costs are rigid.  
It will be more difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime when the 
capital mobility is higher.  
Simply put, adjustments to asymmetric shock are facilitated and the 
pressures for adjustments in exchange rates are reduced when the degree of 
labour mobility is high. 
Degree Openness of the 
Economy (McKinnon, 1963) 
The higher the degree of economic openness of a member country of a 
common currency area, the more the likelihood of the transmission of the 
changes in international prices of tradables to domestic prices. 
If the higher share of domestic outputs of a country are generated from 
trades within the common currency area, such country will benefit from 
membership of the currency union. 
Size of the Economy (McKinnon, 
1963) 
Large economies have the tendencies to be attracted by the flexible exchange 
rate regime implying that medium or small-sized countries find fixed 
exchange rate regime (as desired by monetary union) attractive. 
Diversification of Production, 
Exports and Consumption 
(Kenen, 1969) 
The higher the diversification of production and consumption by member 
countries of a currency union, the more likely the reduction in costs due from 
discarding nominal exchange rate changes between these countries, thus 
finding a common currency as valuable.  
The impact of shocks that are specific to a particular sector of the economy 
would be diluted by high level of diversification in production and 
consumption.  
Consequently, diversification shields economy against series of disturbances 
and causes reduction in the needs for changes in terms of trade through 
nominal exchange rate.  
 
Similarities in Inflation or 
Differences in Inflation 
(Flemming, 1971) 
It is more difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime in situations of 
inflation rate differentials between member countries of a common currency 
area.  
External imbalances can crop up due to continuous differences in inflation 
rates of nations within the common currency area.  
Terms of trade will remain fairly stable when Inflation rates between 
countries are similar over time and at the same time low. 
Fiscal Integration (Kenen, 1969, 
De Bandt & Mongelli, 2000) 
When countries share supranational fiscal transfer system in redistributing 
funds to those member countries that are affected by adverse asymmetric 
shocks, such countries would also have smooth adjustments to such negative 
shocks and would require reduced adjustments in nominal exchange rate.   
This fiscal integration requires the needs to share the risks involved and 
necessitates a high level of political integration.  
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Asymmetric shocks are counteracted through fiscal transfers – (When there 
are shocks,  affecting  particular member countries within a common 
currency area in different ways, fiscal transfers from prosperous member 
countries to non-prosperous member countries would counteract the effects 
of the shocks).  
High degree of policy integration leads to low inflation. 
Political Integration (Mintz 
1970; Harberler, 1970; and 
Cohen, 1993)  
Several authors see economic integration to be so far in front of political 
integration.  
The political determination of countries to integrate is a significant condition 
for sharing a common currency.  
Cooperation on common economic matters, adherence to joint commitments, 
and more international linkage will all be strengthened and enhanced by 
political will of member nations within the common currency area.  
In transforming a group of nations to a successful common currency area, it 
essential that there is similarity of attitudes to politics and policies among 
member countries of the common currency area. 
Financial Market Integration 
(Ingram, 1962) 
The higher the level of financial integration, the greater the extent of the need 
to establish an optimum currency area across geographical blocs.  
The need for exchange rate adjustments can be reduced by financial market 
integration.  
Through capital market inflows, temporary adverse disturbances can be 
cushioned.  
With financial market integration, there will be reduction in the need to 
change inter-regional or intra currency area terms of trade through 
fluctuations in exchange rate.  
For the sustainability of a successful common currency area, tight financial 
market integration is essential. 
 
Similarities of Shocks and 
Similarities in Policy Responses 
to the Shocks (Bayoumi & 
Eichengreen, 1996; Masson 
&Taylor, 1993; Demertizis, 
Hughes &Rummel, 2000; 
Alesina, Barro & Tenreyro, 
2002. 
If member countries of an optimum currency area record similarities in 
demand and supply shocks and the speed of at which their respective 
economy adjust as well as the speed of policy responses, there will be loss of 
monetary policy autonomy and fall in the cost of loss of direct control over 
the nominal exchange rate.  
Member countries of an optimum currency area showing large co-
movements of output and prices would incur the lowest cost of dumping 
monetary independence vis-a-vis other member countries.  
This implying that the higher the similarities in shocks between members of 
a common currency area, the lower the costs of losing independence 
monetary policy. 
Similarities in Monetary Policy 
Transmission (Angeloni, 
Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese, 
2001) 
Similarities in monetary transmission mechanism among member countries 
of an optimum currency area speak volume about the similarities in financial 
structures of these countries.  
External Nominal Shocks Fixed exchange rate regime will not be attractive to a potential member of an 
optimum currency area, if such country faces external nominal shocks. A 
flexible exchange rate system would be more appropriate. 
Monetary Shocks Fixed exchange rate regime will be more attractive to a potential member of 
an optimum currency area, if such country faces monetary shocks. A flexible 
exchange rate system would not be attractive. 
Real Shocks Fixed exchange rate regime will not be attractive to a potential member of an 
optimum currency area if such country faces real shocks. A flexible exchange 
rate system would be more appropriate. 
Business Cycle Synchronisation  Flexible exchange rate regime will not be appropriate if the group of 
countries forming an optimum currency area has synchronised business 
cycle. 
 
Central Bank’s Credibility 
If the central banks of the prospective member of a common currency area 
lack the credibility to moderate inflation, fixed exchange rate regime would 
be more advantageous, rather than flexible exchange rate. 
Monetary Policy Effectiveness For a prospective member of a common currency area, the cost of monetary independence is low (and not a high cost) such country’s monetary policy is 
ineffective.  Sources: Author’s compilations 
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Within the literature, there are many criteria for deciding how suitable countries are for 
an optimum currency area. However, the general agreement among the proponents7 of ‘optimum currency area’ is that in such region, labour is very mobile while economies are 
faced with same forms of economic shocks. The assertion of the OCA literature is that if 
two or more countries are to share the same currency without experiencing negative 
effects, it is necessary and sufficient to meet the OCA criteria. This is a position grounded 
with the assumption that nominal exchange rates are very effective; otherwise countries 
should not abandon their currencies since it would be meaningless to do so. As a major 
macroeconomic stabiliser, exchange rate affects relative prices of all goods, terms of trade 
and wages. Therefore, it is necessary for countries coming together to form a monetary 
union to have some conditions in place so that the functioning of nominal exchange rates 
to be less fascination or attractive as an adjustment tool. 
Separate economic policies are not necessary if countries within a monetary union have 
similar business cycles or rather experience identical shocks. On the other hand, 
asymmetries in output fluctuations and shocks would appropriately necessitate 
individual policy responses. Within the context of the OCA theory, countries are better 
suited to form a currency union the more their business (output) cycles are synchronised 
or symmetric. Negative correlation of business cycles and shocks however, weakens the 
case for a common currency.  
It has be established in literature that flexible exchange rate regime will not be 
appropriate if the group of countries forming an optimum currency area has 
synchronised business cycle. Theoretically, if there is a considerable divergence in the 
business cycles of a countries coming together to form a monetary union, the future common monetary policy will not be optimal for these countries and ‘one size would not fit all’. An expansionary monetary policy will then be more appropriate for the union’s 
member countries experiencing downward moving cycle while the upward trending 
cycle countries with moderate business cycle fluctuations would employ the 
contractionary monetary policy stance. However, countries with moderate business cycle 
fluctuations do not require contractionary or expansionary monetary policy. These are 
issues that undermine the supports for the formation of a currency union hence the 
                                                          
7
 Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Gosh and Wolf (1994), Frankel and Rose (1998) and 
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) 
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necessity for the presence of business cycle synchronicity before the formation of a 
monetary union.  
 
3. Review of Literature Empirical Studies Literature on OCA Perspectives of 
WAMZ Monetary Integration 
From the perspectives of the properties of OCA, a few number of empirical studies have 
evaluated the feasibility of the monetary integration of the WAMZ as well as the viability 
of the membership of the proposed monetary union for prospective member countries. 
Findings and results of some of these empirical researches are discussed in this section. 
An evaluation of the economic rationale for monetary union in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
performed by Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2003) through the use of cluster analyses of a 
sample of 17 countries by adapting variables emanating from the OCA theory (and the 
fear-of-floating literature) to conclude that the creation of the WAMZ around Nigeria is 
not supported by data. The result however, supported the inclusion of The Gambia, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone in an extended WAEMU arrangement or creation of a separate monetary union with the ‘core’ of the WAEMU and The Gambia. Further to this study by Benassy-
Quere and Coupet (2003), Bankage (2008) used the methodology initiated by Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1997) to compute OCA indices for 21 African countries. This study got 
a high predicted volatility for Nigeria in relation to other ECOWAS countries, leading to 
the suggestion that the inclusion of Nigeria in the WAMZ (and in the extended WAEMU) 
is not suitable according to the OCA theory. Cham (2011) assessed the feasibility of the 
WAMZ as a monetary zone using the combination of both macroeconomic convergence 
and the OCA properties (openness, shock synchronisation and labour mobility) to gather 
evidence towards concluding that the degree of labour mobility is low, shocks were not 
synchronised and the degree of openness of members (apart from The Gambia and 
Nigeria) were below average. Omotor and Niringiye (2011) used simple bivariate of vector autoregressive model to assess WAMZ’s feasibility as an OCA from the perspective 
of economic shocks and got results suggesting that the WAMZ is feasible to form an OCA. 
Coleman (2011) investigated business cycle synchronisation in five member countries of 
the WAMZ (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) applying Pearson 
correlation of trend and cyclical component of GDP to investigate co-movements at high 
frequencies between computed Z-scores for pairings of the five candidate countries. The 
results indicated lack of a consistent pattern of synchronised growth cycles which raised 
concerns over economic sustainability of the WAMZ. With the application of 
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cointegration and fractional cointegration methods, inflation dynamics and common 
tendencies of real GDP of the WAMZ countries were investigated by Alagidede et al. 
(2012) to gather evidence of substantial heterogeneities in these respects, across the 
WAMZ.  Raji (2012) applied dynamic GMM and cross country correlation to assessed the 
real exchange rate misalignments and economic performance of the WAMZ to determine 
the implications of these for economic unionisation of the WAMZ to conclude that the 
WAMZ experiences asymmetrical correlations between real exchange rate 
misalignments and economic performances. The cross-country correlation test however 
revealed moderate degree of symmetrical relationship using some macroeconomic 
variables such as real exchange rate, misaligned real exchange rate, openness, inflation 
and output. Costs and benefits of a common currency in the WAMZ were estimated by 
Okafor (2013) by means of behavioural models to capture costs elements (asymmetric 
shocks, loss of monetary autonomy, fiscal distortion) and benefits (trade creation, 
financial integration effects and policy coordination gain)  to yield evidences towards  
suggesting that potential benefits of common currency in the WAMZ will likely be lower 
than marginal costs due to loss of monetary policy sovereignty which could be 
monumental in spite of extended trade creation benefits. In a correlation investigation of 
structural shocks across the WAMZ, Harvey and Cushing (2015) concluded that the 
WAMZ countries responded asymmetrically to common supply, demand and monetary 
shocks and so, will respond differently to a common monetary policy. Assessments of the 
extent of convergence and business cycle synchronisation of business cycles within the 
WAMZ was performed by Alagidede and Tweneboah (2015) in the analyses of growth 
rate convergence. The results gathered suggested dissimilarities in business cycles within the WAMZ. Analyses of trade within the WAMZ and WAMZ’s trade with other countries 
with West Africa, Europe and Asia were made by Mensah (2016) who found strong 
evidence against trade symmetry in the WAMZ as well as some evidences of marginal 
convergence in inflation, real GDP growth and monetary policy rate, with reasons to infer 
that partial convergence in the WAMZ as well as significantly low trade within the WAMZ 
and the WAMZ countries with outside world. It is apparent that the body of literature 
reviewed in this section made efforts in examining the OCA perspective of monetary 
integration of the WAMZ.  
Despite this, it still significant to augment the value of the compendium of these empirical 
feasibility research works through added knowledge introduced into such evaluation 
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through various business cycles synchronicity assessments of monetary integration of 
the West African sub-region performed through this paper. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
The approach of this study to the assessment of the business synchronisation of the 
WAMZ countries was the investigation of the similarity and the co-movements between 
the two main components of business cycles: (i) the classical business cycles and (ii) the 
deviation business cycles. The classical business cycle, through examination of the swings 
in the real GDP growth rates, pays attention to the upward and downward movements in 
economic activities of the WAMZ countries while the emphasis of the deviation business 
cycle is on the investigation of the output gap, which is the deviation of the real GDP from 
a trend, and this is synonymous with the concept of recessions and booms. The 
assessment of classical and deviation business cycles in this study applied annual data 
real GDP and real GDP growth respectively for the WAMZ countries employing simple 
correlation analyses and the analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
The ANOVA tests performed here showed the statistical significance of the differences (or 
otherwise) in a variable of member countries being analysed. The statistical assumptions 
in an ANOVA test are independence of errors, normality and equality of variance. The 
one-way ANOVA is appropriate in a statistical model in which no restriction are imposed 
on means of the population group and the outcomes for each group in the analysis are 
normally distributed displaying common variances while it is assumed that the 
deviations of these individual outcomes from the means of the population group are independent.  Generally, the null hypothesis for an ANOVA test is a ‘point hypothesis’ which states that ‘there is nothing interesting happening’. In a one-way ANOVA test, the 
null hypothesis with j group is: 
H0 = μ1 = μ2 =........... μj 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
HA = μ1 ≠ μ2≠........... μj 
Where: μ = the population mean. 
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Specifically for this analysis, the null hypothesis is: 
H0 = Gambia = Ghana =Guinea = Liberia = Nigeria = Sierra Leone 
and the alternative hypothesis is: 
HA = Gambia ≠ Ghana ≠ Guinea ≠ Liberia ≠ Nigeria ≠ Sierra Leone 
The null hypothesis was that the mean of the classical and deviation business cycles in 
the six WAMZ countries are equal. For analysis at 95% level of confidence, the rule here 
is that if the p-value obtained from the test should be less than the 5% level of 
significance, the difference in the variable/ratio among the WAMZ countries is 
statistically significance and so, we reject the null hypothesis. 
The ANOVA method would check how significantly different are the means of the two 
components of business cycles in the WAMZ countries under investigation. Further 
efforts in the investigation was made in measuring synchronicity of business cycle 
through the observation of the closeness of coefficient of variations of classical and 
deviation business cycles of individual WAMZ country. It is important to compare 
patterns of business cycles in the WAMZ countries in times when there were no 
necessities for meeting criteria for memberships of a monetary union (pre-convergence 
period) and the monetary union member run-on period when convergence criteria are 
to be met (convergence period). The business cycle assessment was therefore split into 
two periods: (i) pre-convergence period (1981-2000); (ii) convergence period (2001 -
2015). The comparison of the results in these two periods is necessary because of the 
possibility of these WAMZ countries behaving ‘artificially’ in their business attitudes 
during the convergence era, when efforts were being made to meet the convergence 
criteria. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering method (at lambda=100) was applied in 
filtering and decomposing the real output (GDP) of individual WAMZ countries into 
transitory and permanent components required for the assessment of classical and 
deviation business cycles in these countries. Correlation tests as well as tests of 
homogeneity of variance (Levene Statistics) in business cycles were performed. There 
were further investigations of the transitory and deviation (output gap) business cycles 
so as to determine the extent of cyclical convergence of members of the proposed 
monetary union, which is relevant for the conduct of the future common monetary 
policy in the zone. Fifteen bilateral Euclidean distances between output gaps in the 
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WAMZ countries were also measured in order to reveal the extent of business cycle co-
movements among member countries. Statistically, Euclidean distance between two 
variables x and y (specifically, of output gaps in this study) can be defined as:  𝑑 = √Σ𝑖=1𝑛 (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)2 
Euclidean distance investigates the root of square difference between coordinates of a 
pair of variable or objects, in this case, output gaps. Levene’s test is an inferential statistic test applied in examining the equality of variance for a variable for two or more groups. The assumption of Levene’s test is that there is 
equality in the variance of the population from which different samples are drawn. The statement of null hypothesis of the Levene’s test tested is: 𝐻0 = 𝜎𝑖2 = 𝜎𝑗2 … . . = 𝜎𝑘2 
while the alternative hypothesis is: 𝐻𝐴 ≠ 𝜎𝑖2 ≠ 𝜎𝑗2…… ≠ 𝜎𝑘2 
The null hypothesis is that the population variance are equal (that is, there homogeneity in variance). The Levene’s test uses an F-test statistic to test the null hypothesis; and a 
statistically significant statistic violates the assumption in the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, if the probability value (p-value) generated from the test reflects statistically 
significance at the set level of significance, the null hypothesis of equality of variances 
should be rejected with the conclusion that the variance in the population are not equal. 
5. Results and Findings 
The patterns of the variations in the real GDP of the WAMZ countries for the Pre-
convergence period (1991 to 2000) and the Convergence Period (2001-2015) was 
displayed in Figure 1 below. Liberia recorded the highest degree of dispersion from the 
mean in both periods, and followed by Ghana. Although, The Gambia appears a bit steady, 
the pattern of variations demonstrated by the WAMZ countries in these two periods were 
heterogeneous. 
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Figure 1: Coefficients of Variation of Real GDP of the WAMZ Countries  
 Source: EIU database and author’s calculations 
Tables 7 and 8 below reveal that the degrees of correlation of the classical business cycles 
in the two periods under study were evidently weak generally, given the low coefficients 
of correlation. There was a mix of negative and positive correlations in the two periods.  
Table 7: Correlation Matrix of Classical Business Cycles in the WAMZ (Pre-Convergence Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.37 1     
Guinea -0.05 -0.01 1    
Liberia 0.22 0.36 0.27 1   
Nigeria 0.17 -0.09 -0.46 0.20 1  
Sierra Leone 0.18 0.33 -0.25 -0.25 0.31 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Table 8: Correlation Matrix of Classical Business Cycles in the WAMZ (Convergence Criteria 
Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana -0.52 1     
Guinea -0.57 0.34 1    
Liberia -0.41 -0.05 0.41 1   
Nigeria 0.24 0.26 -0.54 -0.83 1  
Sierra Leone -0.42 -0.30 0.62 0.39 -0.55 1 
       
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
In Table 7, in the PC phase, the highest degree of correlation of 37% was between Ghana 
and The Gambia while 61.5% correlation between Guinea and Sierra Leone was the 
highest in the CC period as shown in Table 8.  
11.36 13.04
29.08
25.42
12.56 9.48
60.87
29.33
6.63 18.1417.28
24.26
PRE-CONVERGENCE PERIOD CONVERGENCE PERIOD
Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix of Transitory Component Business Cycles in the WAMZ  
(Pre-Convergence Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana -0.06 1     
Guinea 0.38 0.43 1    
Liberia 0.50 -0.08 0.15 1   
Nigeria 0.47 -0.27 -0.07 0.69 1  
Sierra Leone -0.14 -0.10 0.01 0.40 0.59 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Table 10: Correlation Matrix of Transitory Component Business Cycles in the WAMZ (Convergence 
Criteria Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana -0.17 1     
Guinea -0.38 0.48 1    
Liberia 0.49 0.40 0.29 1   
Nigeria -0.49 -0.48 -0.05 -0.87 1  
Sierra Leone -0.57 0.38 0.89 -0.14 0.272546 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
For the de-trended business cycle which is the transitory component (cycle) of output, 
the correlation for the PC and the CC periods were also characterised by weak and 
negative correlation coefficients among the WAMZ countries. For the transitory business 
cycles, Table 9 and 10 above display the correlation in the PC and CC periods. In the PC 
period, as revealed in Table 9, the highest correlation of 68.6% was between Liberia and 
Nigeria and this fell to a negative of -87% in the CC period. Table 10 also shows that the 
89% correlation between Guinea and Sierra Leone was the highest for the PC period; 
followed by The Gambia/Liberia 49% correlation. When output gaps were applied in the 
test of synchronicity of deviation cycles, there were evidences of weak correlation as 
Nigeria/Liberia association displays the highest of 68% followed by 59% of 
Nigeria/Sierra Leone and 59% of Liberia/The Gambia as exhibited in Table 11 below. For 
the CC period, the results in correlation of output gaps in Table 12 also reveal many 
negative and weak positive correlations. The highest in this phase was the Guinea/Sierra 
Leone 86% and the Gambia/Liberia 52%. Owing to the implications of high degree of 
correlation for synchronicity, the results for the PC and the CC periods brought forth the 
evidences that the classical business cycles, the transitory business cycles and the 
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deviation business cycles in the WAMZ were not synchronised over the period covered 
by the investigations. This has negative implications for the feasibility of the proposed 
currency union the West African region in facing business cycle shocks.  
Table 11: Correlation Matrix of Deviation (Output Gaps) Business Cycles in the WAMZ  
(Pre-Convergence Criteria Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.01 1     
Guinea 0.38 0.50 1    
Liberia 0.59 0.23 0.39 1   
Nigeria 0.53 -0.14 0.06 0.68 1  
Sierra Leone -0.16 -0.04 -0.03 0.33 0.59 1 
       
       Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Table 12: Correlation Matrix of Deviation (Output Gaps) Business Cycles in the WAMZ  
(Convergence Criteria Period) 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.07 1     
Guinea -0.32 0.33 1    
Liberia 0.52 0.49 0.36 1   
Nigeria -0.53 -0.61 -0.10 -0.88 1  
Sierra Leone -0.55 0.07 0.86 -0.11 0.32 1 
       
       Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Evidences gathered from the analyses of variances (ANOVA test) under the three 
business cycle scenarios and for the PC and the CC periods are specified in Table 13 
below.8  
Table 13: Results of ANOVA Tests on Business Cycles in the WAMZ Countries 
 F-statistic Probability 
Classical Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
0.5694 
1.7411 
 
0.723 
0.137 
Transitory Components Business 
Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
9.85E-24 
1.91E-25 
 
1.000 
1.000 
Deviation (Output Gaps) Business 
Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
0.0008 
0.0030 
 
1.000 
1.000 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
For the classical business cycles, with the p-values of 0.723 for the PC period and 0.137 
for the CC period, we cannot reject the null hypothesis to conclude that the means of the 
                                                          
8The decision to reject the null hypothesis is taken by examining the probability values (p-values) in the results of the 
tests. At 5% level of significance, if the resulting p-value is less that that 0.05 or 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected, 
implying statistical significant difference in the means of the business cycles under investigation. 
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classical business cycles (the output growth paths) of the WAMZ countries were similar 
during the two periods.  
Table 14: Results of Tests of Homogeneity of Variance (Levene Statistics) in Business Cycles  
 (Levene) F-
statistic 
Probability 
Value 
Classical Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
9.8379 
4.0693 
 
0.000 
0.002 
Transitory Components Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
9.7211 
73.9075 
 
0.000 
0.000 
Deviation (Output Gaps)Business Cycles: 
* Pre-convergence period 
* Convergence 
 
13.3961 
7.1337 
 
0.000 
0.000 
    Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
Since this p-value is greater than 0.05 (for the 5% significant level), the null hypothesis 
of equality in means of these business cycles cannot be rejected implying that they do not 
differ significantly in transitory and deviation business cycles in the WAMZ. However, 
Table 14 above shows the Levene’s tests of homogeneity of variance among the WAMZ 
countries under the three scenarios of business cycles reporting p-values of 0.00 for both 
periods.  
A brief summary of evident derived from the correlation and ANOVA tests carried out 
suggest that while business cycles in the WAMZ were not well synchronised as evident 
by the correlation analyses,9ANOVA tests revealed homogeneity of business cycles in the 
zone, though there was heterogeneity in the variances of the zone’s business cycles.  
Table 15: Standard Deviations of the Classes of Business Cycles of the WAMZ Countries (Pre-
Convergence Criteria and Convergence Periods) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Classical Business Cycle: 
* Pre- convergence period 
* Convergence period 
 
3.018 
3.942 
 
0.678 
2.650 
 
0.934 
1.632 
 
41.827 
15.715 
 
9.7135 
1.329 
 
8.468 
7.240 
Transitory Component 
Business Cycle: 
* Pre- convergence period 
* Convergence period 
 
 
0.026 
0.030 
 
 
0.733 
0.781 
 
 
0.033 
0.049 
 
 
0.097 
0.110 
 
 
0.930 
8.689 
 
 
0.053 
0.066 
Deviation(Output Gap) 
Business Cycle: 
* Pre- convergence period 
* Convergence period 
 
 
5.857 
4.400 
 
 
8.849 
3.801 
 
 
1.597 
1.590 
 
 
54.251 
18.232 
 
 
1.539 
8.665 
 
 
6.918 
4.804 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
                                                          
9Correlation is an indicator of business cycle synchronisation. 
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Another look into business cycle synchronicity in the WAMZ was the investigation of the 
transitory and deviation (output gap) business cycles so as to determine the extent of 
cyclical convergence of members of the proposed monetary union, which is relevant for 
the conduct of the future common monetary policy in the zone. This test was carried out 
through the evaluation of the evolution of (dispersions) standard deviations of these 
classes of business. The smaller the degree of dispersion (measured by standard 
deviation) over the period investigated, the closer the clustering of individual WAMZ countries’ business cycle. This measures absolute degree of dispersion. Table 15 above 
shows that for all the WAMZ countries, the standard deviations of the transitory business 
cycles for the PC and the CC periods generally were low and less than unity while the 
deviation (output gaps) business cycles and the classical (growth) business cycles for all 
the WAMZ countries exhibit single digits standard deviation apart from Liberia which 
recorded for the deviation (output gaps) business cycle, highs of 54.25 and 18.23 
standard deviations in the PC period and the CC period respectively as this country 
displayed 41.83 and 15.71 standard deviation for the growth business cycle in the two 
periods. 
Table 16: Results of Estimates of Euclidean Distances between Output Gaps in WAMZ Countries 
 Euclidean Distances (Pre-
Convergence Period) 
Euclidean Distances 
(Convergence Period) 
Gambia-Ghana 0.002617 0.12601 
Gambia-Guinea 0.001836 0.001689 
Gambia-Nigeria 0.51388 0.00578 
Gambia-Liberia 0.001957 0.297233 
Gambia-Sierra Leone 0.04867 0.00603 
Ghana-Guinea 0.00078 0.127698 
Ghana-Liberia 0.5165 0.12023 
Ghana-Nigeria 0.00066 0.423242 
Ghana-Sierra Leone 0.05129 0.132039 
Guinea-Liberia 0.51572 0.00747 
Guinea-Nigeria 0.000121 0.295544 
Guinea-Sierra Leone 0.05051 0.004341 
Liberia-Nigeria 0.515839 0.303012 
Liberia-Sierra Leone 0.465208 0.011809 
Nigeria-Sierra Leone 0.05063 0.2912 
          Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
From Table 16 above, the evidences gathered from the estimates of the fifteen bilateral 
Euclidean distances between output gaps in the WAMZ further revealed the degree of 
business cycle co-movements among member countries. The rule is that the lower the 
value of the bilateral Euclidean distance, the higher the degree of similarities in business 
cycles of the two countries.  
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In the PC period, Guinea/Nigeria had the highest degree of business cycle similarity as 
evident by the lowest Euclidean distance of 0.000121, followed by Ghana/Nigeria, 
Ghana/Guinea and The Gambia/Guinea recording 0.00066, 0.00078 and 0.001836 
bilateral Euclidean distances respectively. The lowest degree of business cycle similarity 
in the PC era is displayed by Liberia/Nigeria at 0.51584 bilateral Euclidean distance. For 
the CC period, Gambia/Guinea produced the highest degree of business cycle co-
movement at 0.001689 Euclidean distances as Guinea/Sierra Leone (0.00434), The 
Gambia/Sierra Leone (0.00603) and Guinea/Liberia (0.00747) follow. Displaying a 
Euclidean distance of 0.42324, Ghana/Nigeria implies the lowest degree of business cycle 
co-movement in this era. The tests of Euclidean distances showed that in the PC period, 
Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria were prominent with high degrees of business cycle co-
movements while Guinea, Sierra Leone and The Gambia reflected same during the CC era. 
However, many of the bilateral Euclidean distance obtained for the PC period differ from 
the evidence got for the CC period. The results for the PC period were more encouraging 
than those of the monetary union run-up CC period. For instance, Guinea/Nigeria 
showing the highest degree of co-movement in the PC period fell to the group of the ‘least’ 
during the CC period. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that the results of the monetary 
union run-up CC period exhibits seven (7) ‘drops’ in the Euclidean distances when 
compared to what obtained for the PC period. This depicts appreciable journey towards 
business cycle co-movements in the WAMZ. The conclusion for the estimates of Euclidean 
distances between output gaps is the failure of these countries to exhibit many desired 
low bilateral values that would have suggested reasonable extent of business cycles 
similarities and co-movements in the WAMZ as this would have arouse the confidence in 
concluding that the zone is feasible for a monetary union.  
6. Conclusions 
Within the context of the theory of OCA, countries are better suited to form a currency 
union the more their business (output) cycles are synchronised or symmetric. If countries 
within a monetary union have similar business cycles or rather experience identical 
shocks, separate economic policies are not necessary. On the contrary, asymmetries in 
output fluctuations and shocks would appropriately necessitate individual policy 
responses. The business cycle analysis of the monetary integration feasibility of the 
WAMZ performed in this research study produced evidences to suggest that the extent of 
business cycle synchronicity was low particularly during the pre-convergence period. 
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The results for the convergence period were much better. However, on the overall, the 
assessments here suggest unsynchronised business cycles across the WAMZ. Therefore, 
in general terms, from the monetary integration feasibility evaluation produced, it can be 
concluded that the WAMZ has failed the business cycle synchronicity tests. This 
consequently weakens the case for a common currency for the WAMZ. An extended 
business cycle evaluation of the 15-country ECOWAS at large is significant in testing if 
there would be a strong case for a common currency in West Africa at large. 
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